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The Chicago cap-and-trade approach to regulating stationary source VOC emissions in 
the Chicago ozone non-attainment area is a pioneering program that could set a precedent 
for other urban areas troubled by high ozone concentrations.  It holds out the promise of 
cost-effectiveness, innovation stimulation, and flexibility compared with traditional 
regulation.  To appraise this program design and evaluate these objectives, this study 
analyzes four years of data since the inception of the program in 2000.  The data reveal 
that while emissions are far below the cap, there are unexpectedly large banks, startling 
expirations, and low prices of tradable permits, all inconsistent with an effective market. 
 
We find that the market as designed has been constrained from reaching its objectives by 
the continuance and extension of an underlying layer of traditional regulation, and to a 
lesser extent by over-allotment of tradable permits.  That is, traditional regulation and 
over-allotment, combined with a market design calling for a small reduction in emissions 
from baseline and a one-year limit on banking, explain the incongruous outcomes 
recorded in the market.  This study explores the evolution of this particular market design 
and presents statistical evidence in support of the hypothesis that the performance of a 
cap-and-trade market is very sensitive to design features when combined with other 
regulatory measures.   
 
The study concludes that the market as presently designed falls far short of achieving cost 
effectiveness, innovation stimulation, and flexibility.  The policy recommendations 
include that the cap be significantly tightened, perhaps in a series of steps, and the 
banking horizon be extended to three years or more.  Such redesign should enable the 
cap-and-trade approach to assume its proper role in helping to achieve the new eight-hour 
standard for ozone concentrations. 
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The Consequences of Market Design for Performance 
 
R. F. Kosobud, H.H. Stokes, C.D. Tallarico, and B.L. Scott1
 
Introduction   
 
An important reason attention has been focused on the Chicago area cap-and-trade 
program, designed to reduce stationary-source VOC emissions in the local ozone non-
attainment area, is that no other area of the country has yet proved that VOC emissions 
trading would work in any significant fashion as an alternative to prescriptive regulation. 
This suggests that there may be difficulties in implementing VOC emissions trading 
(Lents 2000).  However, there exist strong pressures for introducing this innovative 
regulatory measure, perhaps the major ones being the relatively stubborn nature of urban 
ozone and smog problems, the unfavorable impact of these pollutants on human health 
and esthetic considerations, and the varying and mounting marginal costs of reducing 
these pollutants by traditional regulation (Stavins 2000). The question becomes: can 
decentralized market incentive regulation help achieve these VOC reductions in a cost-
effective manner? After four years of recorded performance, 2000 through 2003, of this 
pioneering approach, enough data are available to begin to search for answers. 
 
First, in terms of the attainment of several important environmental objectives, the three 
years for which aggregate data are available, 2000 through 2002, appear to have 
witnessed VOC emission reductions in each year, as revealed in table 1.  These emissions 
were far below allotments of tradable permits and thus even further below the baseline of 
historical emissions. These lowered aggregate emissions have not been associated with 
observable spatial hot spots, or neighborhood increases in emissions during this period, 
nor were inter-temporal hot spots or spikes recorded. To the extent that baseline 
emissions were not seriously overstated, the air was cleaner and health benefits enhanced 
at the end of this period with respect to this pollutant, a precursor of low-level ozone.  It 
is easy to conclude that this new decentralized emissions trading measure has achieved 
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this improvement in air quality and is therefore to be considered a success. The intense 
local debate about this program prior to the start of the market has largely been turned 
aside by these emission reductions. 
 
What is open to serious question, however, is the extent to which this particular market 
design and mechanism is responsible for these results.  Equally important is the question 
of whether this market has fulfilled its promise in all respects as a new regulatory policy 
instrument. These promises included, in addition to emission reductions, cost 
effectiveness, innovation stimulation, and flexibility compared with traditional 
regulation. Answering these questions by probing the market data more deeply is the 
objective of this study. We will find that there are reasons other than the market and 
market cap that explain much of the emission reductions, and that there are constraints on 
market decisions that explain many of the market outcomes that are difficult to 
rationalize in terms of cost minimization incentives.  These reasons and constraints, not 
market incentives, can account for much of the apparent and startling emission 
reductions, the enormous banks of tradable emission permits, the large expiration of 
valuable permits, and the lack of demand which led to very low permit prices being 
recorded during the first three years. 
 
In an earlier study we developed a cost minimization model of the cap-and-trade market 
that led to predictions of market events so far from observed values that we abandoned 
that model and adopted the wider framework of this paper (Kosobud, Stokes, and 
Tallarico 2001). Our revised major hypothesis explaining the puzzling performance of 
this cap-and-trade market is that the continuance and extension of traditional regulation 
on emitters acted in concert with the market design to constrain market incentives and 
participant decisions.  That is, traditional regulation was binding on participants, not the 
market that featured a proposed modest emissions reduction and a one-year limit on 
banking.  We also investigate the hypothesis that the agency’s baseline determinations for 
individual participants were overly generous or excessive; that is, officially approved 
baseline emissions were larger than actual emissions during the historical period.  The 
consequence would be that the allotments of tradable permits calculated from the  
baselines resulted in a large surplus of tradable permits that bore heavily on the market.  
We present a statistical analysis of these ideas that confirms our major hypothesis.  
 
This study is organized, first, to present data on official baselines and allotments, 
aggregate emissions, and market activity for the first three years for which we have 
agency data.  Then, we proceed to describe the pressures on the regulatory agency during 
the evolution of the particular design of the cap-and-trade market that includes the 
determination of baselines, the decision on the cap, and the banking horizon.  Next, we 
develop our hypotheses and explain the datasets in preparation for statistical tests.  These 
datasets include measures of the effects of traditional regulation and possible excessive 
allotments on four years of individual participant transactions data. Among the statistical 
techniques chosen to test these ideas will be ordinary least squares (OLS) and probit 
regression analysis that seem well suited to the distributions and character of key 
variables. The study ends with suggestions for public policy changes that could improve 
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market performance, especially in light of the implementation of the forthcoming eight-
hour standard for low-level ozone concentrations. 
 
 
The Anomalous Three-Year Record: 2000 to 2002 
 
Table 1 presents basic aggregate data on baselines and allotments and on market activity 
over three years in the Chicago six-county urban ozone non-attainment area. We have 
relied on data provided by the Illinois EPA in its annual performance reports, but have 
assembled the information in a new format to bring out more clearly the puzzling results 
of this period (Illinois EPA 2001, 2002, 2003). 
 
The first category presents the baseline or benchmark emissions of market participants in 
tradable permits or Allotment Trading Units (ATUs) each measured as 200 pounds of 
VOC emissions.  This aggregate value was based on the average of 1994 through 1996 
emissions with some important exceptions that we shall explain later.  This aggregate 
value is the sum of individual participant baselines determined by the Illinois EPA. 
Estimation of VOC emissions is difficult at best, as continuous emissions monitoring is 
feasible in only a few instances. Participants had every reason to negotiate for the largest 
baseline possible as allotments derive from that value, and the agency, in an effort to 
secure support for a new and innovative program, had reasons to accede to requests. The 
aggregate baseline varies slightly from year to year as negotiations continue over the 
historical period, as a few new emitters enter the market, and as a few old drop out when 
their emissions declined below the threshold.   
 
The second category presents aggregate allotments of tradable ATUs to emitters. Those 
with emissions greater than 15 tons of VOCs during the ozone seasons were required to 
participate in the market, while those with emissions between 10 and 15 tons could opt in 
voluntarily. Allotments were to be a 12% reduction from baselines, a determination by 
the agency thought necessary, in conjunction with traditional regulation of mobile and 
small area VOC sources, to reach attainment of ozone standards by 2007.  Stationary 
source emissions made up about 20% of all VOC emissions. In addition to the 
negotiations over baselines, there were further agency adjustments to individual 
participants by allotting permits in full for hazardous air pollutant emissions (HAPs), 
subject to the most stringent controls, and allotting permits in full for any emissions 
limited by new, more advanced control technologies that performed better than traditional 
regulation.  Therefore, the aggregate reduction, the difference between categories 1 and 2, 
is about 10%, somewhat less than the policy goal of 12% (Illinois EPA 2002).  
 
The third category presents data on aggregate emissions during each year as measured by 
ATUs retired (returned) to the government by market participants for each 200 pounds of 
VOC emissions as measured during the ozone season from May through September. 
Emissions were self-reported with monitoring checks by the agency. As ATUs may be 
banked for a year, retirements to cover emissions after the first year may be made with 
current or previously allotted permits as noted. The deep reductions in emissions as 




         Market-Wide ATU Transactions and Prices for the Years 2000 - 2002 
      (In ATUs or ATU equivalents: an ATU = 200 pounds of VOC emissions) 
 
Category                             Year 2000 Year 2001 Year 2002
    
1. Baseline in ATU units       105,479 107,777 108,718 
    
2. Allotted ATUs                  95,398 97,124 98,164 
    
3. ATU retirements (reported emissions)           59,112 51,622 50,985 
     3.1 Vintage 2000 ATUs   59,112 21,407  
     3.2 Vintage 2001 ATUs  30,215 31,575 
     3.3 Vintage 2002 ATUs   19,410 
    
4. ATU transactions    
     4.1 ATUs transacted       1,643 3,702 4,483 
     4.2  Number of buyers  29 25 31 
     4.3  Number of sellers 22 21 23 
    
5. Banked ATUs    
    5.1  Vintage 2000 ATUs    37,435   
    5.2  Vintage 2001 ATUs  73,401  
    5.3  Vintage 2002 ATUs   82,358 
    
6. Expired ATUs    
    6.1 Vintage 2000 ATUs  13,924  
    6.2 Vintage 2001 ATUs   33,760 
    6.3 Vintage 2002 ATUs    
    
7. ATU prices     
    7.1  Average price     $75.87  $51.93  $32.85  
    7.2  Price range                   $50 to $150 $38 to $100 $20 to $50 
    7.3  Vintage 2000 price              $75.87  $50.54   
    7.4  Vintage 2001 price    $63.93  $32.06  
    7.5  Vintage 2002 price   $31.04  
    
8. Number of participants           179 172 172 
    
 
Notes:  The internal consistency of the table is affected by several types of transactions 
not enumerated, as explained in the text.  Sources:  Illinois EPA Annual Performance 
Review Reports, 2001, 2002, and 2003. 
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central puzzles of this period. These reductions were on average about 50% of the 
aggregate baseline and a slightly higher percentage of the allotment during the four years. 
 
The fourth category presents data on market transactions of ATUs available for use 
during the year, one of the important decisions made by emitters. As is readily apparent, 
these transactions were a small share of allotments being less than 5% in all four years.  
 
The fifth category presents aggregate banks of ATUs at the end of the ozone and 
reconciliation periods. It is worth repeating that under current rules, dated ATUs may be 
banked for only one year after issue so that each banked permit must be used in the 
following period, or it will expire.  Consequently, another puzzle of the market  
performance is the rapid growth of banked ATUs to the point that, at the end of 2001,  
they were larger than emissions in 2002. The problem for participants with such large 
banks is that many of them will expire. 
 
The participants’ decisions to trade, reduce emissions, or bank ATUs as revealed in 
categories 3, 4 and 5 should be tightly interrelated if cost minimization is the objective.   
One consequence of cost minimization is that all banked ATUs of vintage t must be used 
in t+1 to avoid expiration. This did not occur and resulted in a large number of 
expirations.    
 
The sixth category presents data on expirations of valuable tradable permits and, as 
mentioned, should equal zero if the cost minimization identity were to hold.  It did not for 
each of the years following the first year when no prior banks existed.  Instead 
expirations grew in magnitude year by year to the extent that vintage 2001 permit 
expirations in the year 2002 made up over a third of vintage 2001 allotments. This is 
among the most perplexing inconsistencies of reported market activity, as it would seem 
to amount to giving away valuable permits. We consider asymmetric transactions costs at 
a later point as one possible explanation of this puzzle, but we find that the large emission 
reductions are largely due to traditional regulation.  These reductions lead to such large 
volumes of banked ATUs that expirations of permits inevitably follow. 
 
Note that the number of vintage banked ATUs need not equal exactly the next year’s sum 
of the same vintage retirements or expirations because a number of banked permits could 
be donated to community groups as a contribution to cleaner air. These contributions, 
which would have public relations value if not tax implications, were small in number 
during the three years.  Another small discrepancy affecting the internal consistency of 
table 1 arises when several participants acquired additional ATUs from a special set-aside 
account at prices above market. However, these transactions explain only some of the 
inconsistencies of table 1, which can amount to about a 3% difference between sources 
and uses of ATUs.  These inconsistencies have been called to the attention of the agency. 
 
The seventh category presents data on ATU average prices calculated by the agency from 
individual transaction prices after the transactions period closed.  Individual prices of 
transactions are not reported. The steady decline in average price from about $76 in the 
first year to less than $33 in the third is a trend and level that no one would have 
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predicted at the start, including the authors.  Prices were not reported for intra-firm 
transactions nor were prices included when ATUs were purchased from the agency’s 
special set-aside account.  There were several transfer agreements involving multi-year 
ATUs the prices of which were also not included in the averages. 
 
Several more comments are in order on the price patterns of category seven. As permits 
of two vintages could be traded after the first year, given the banking rule, there are in 
effect two different commodities with a different time dimension during those following 
years.  Given that a permit that could be used in a current or subsequent year provides 
more options than a permit that will expire at the end of the current year, the observer 
would predict the former would command an equal or higher price than the latter. That 
was true for 2001 when the differential was over $13 a permit.  That was not true for 
2002 when the difference was reversed. This is a kind of backwardation that is difficult, 
if not impossible, to explain or interpret in any optimizing framework, and creates 
another puzzle in the pricing realm.  
The final category presents data on the number of emitters that participated in the market.  
Those facilities with emissions under 15 tons during the season were not required to 
participate in the market nor were emitters that reduced their emissions by more than 
18% by the baseline determination period. The number of emitters could change as new 
emitters located in the area or emitters that qualified dropped out, or emitters opted in, 
but the number of such changes was relatively small. There remained 179 market 
participants in the year 2000 that varied widely in size, in SIC classification, and in 
production processes and inputs that gave rise to VOC emissions. This diversity meant 
that numerous, different, and expanded traditional regulations were applied to these 
specific sources of emissions. As these regulations play an important role in our analysis 
of market performance, we provide a more detailed description of them in a later section.  
 
The observer who notes only category three and reads that emission reductions were well 
below the cap might conclude that all was well with the use of the cap-and-trade market 
to reduce VOC emissions, and that the present design could be recommended to other 
cities looking for cost-effective control of this precursor of low-level ozone 
concentrations. In the format that we have prepared, categories four through seven raise 
serious questions about that conclusion and convince us that the work has just begun in 
understanding this new regulatory measure, with its particular design, before 
recommending adoption elsewhere. A closer examination not only of emission reductions 
but also of huge banks, very large expirations, and very low prices is required and 
undertaken in this study.  
 
A Post-Mortem on The Early Market Modeling and Forecasts of ATU Prices 
 
At first glance such deep emission reductions from stationary sources far beyond the cap 
could be considered a contribution to cleaner air and a benefit to the public’s health.  On 
reflection, such deep reductions raise questions about the relationship between marginal 
control costs of stationary sources and emission reductions.  Reductions could be 
characterized as "excessive" if they required higher marginal control costs than 
warranted, and thus would be an unwise use of resources. If balancing health benefits and 
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control costs indicate that such deep reductions are in the public interest, then why was 
the cap, a public policy decision, chosen to make such a small reduction in emissions?  
We describe how the cap was chosen in a later section and find that the deep emission 
reductions were not mainly the result of the cap as chosen since the cap was binding on 
only a small proportion of emitters. What was mainly binding on source emissions, as we 
shall demonstrate, was the extensive traditional regulation. 
 
Were these emission reductions from stationary sources far below the cap properly 
anticipated when policy decisions were made about the market design? There seemed to 
be other concerns as the agency developed the new program as only a part, and not the 
major part, of its efforts to reach ozone attainment. The Illinois EPA was concerned about 
several matters: the acceptance of the innovative regulation, the accurate certification of 
emissions and their conversion to tradable permits, the appropriate monitoring procedures 
to track the quantities and location of transactions, and the effective enforcement 
structures to create incentives for adherence to market rules.  In deciding upon the final 
design, the agency seemed concerned about such negative outcomes as the generation of 
hot spots, or neighborhood increases in emissions, and the occurrence of inter-temporal 
spikes in emissions due to market trading. 
 
When it became apparent that emissions were far below baseline with none of the adverse 
results that concerned the agency, the result was welcomed and greeted as a benefit to 
cleaner air.  The fact that the cap-and-trade market as a regulatory tool was not operating 
effectively in the present circumstances was evidently not a matter that attracted much 
attention in the light of the achievement of emission reductions.   
 
One of the imperfections of the cap-and-trade market in these circumstances was that 
many participants were not equating marginal control costs to the tradable permit price; 
that is, the market price was not binding. Marginal control costs were being determined in 
most cases by the requirements of traditional regulation, which differed widely in their 
impact on individual emitters. Equality of marginal costs is a requirement for cost-
effective allocation of emission reductions among emitters. Many of the early studies of 
the Chicago approach were based upon theories of the functioning of an ideal market 
with prices and transactions based upon cost-minimizing calculations and expectations of 
participants. In other words, they were normative studies and not based upon an 
examination of the detailed market design and setting.  In particular, they ignored the role 
of traditional regulation. Their primary aim was to estimate ATU prices based on 
engineering studies of control technologies, both existing and emerging.  
 
An early study of the Illinois EPA using 1996 engineering data on various control 
technologies estimated that the marginal control costs of reducing VOC emissions in SIC 
classifications would be about $2,580 per ton, or $258 per ATU (Illinois EPA 1996). A 
study by the World Bank based on different marginal cost data estimated prices not far 
from this value (World Bank 1994). A study carried out by researchers using a linear 
programming model to illustrate the use of new control options for VOC reductions 
estimated the marginal control cost to be in the same range (Evans et al 1997).   A survey 
of marginal control costs around the US in 1999 yielded a median price estimate of 
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$3,500 per ton of VOC emission reductions with a range from $2000 to $13,000; that is a 
median of $350 per tradable permit with a range of $200 to $1,300 (Cantor Fitzgerald 
1999). 
 
What was abstracted from these modeling efforts was the continuance and significant 
extension of traditional regulations that took place during the 1990s (US EPA 2004a, 
2004b). In the models it was as if the cap-and-trade approach, a decentralized measure, 
was to operate at a level beyond or above centralized measures, making its own and 
separate contribution to emission reductions and cost-effective control.  Operating in this 
market, participants would equate marginal control costs to observed permit prices, and 
marginal control costs would be determined by the 12% reduction from benchmark 
emissions required by the cap.  It greatly simplified the modeling and the determination 
of an equilibrium price to assume that this reduction was binding. 
 
Could these early and erroneous forecasts of high VOC marginal control costs have led 
participants to expect high tradable permit prices, which were later not realized, and 
hence to initiate emission reduction efforts based upon both existing and new control 
measures? It is difficult to get direct evidence on this hypothesis without sample surveys 
of participants’ intentions, but there are a number of persuasive reasons that militate 
against this view. One important reason would be the small size of the emission reduction 
required by the cap that would seem to leave little incentive for significant control 
expenditures.  In addition, many important emitter decisions about control of VOC 
emissions were made well before details of the design of the market were available and 
well before price forecasts were available. We devise a test that shows little significance 
of marginal control costs in determining transactions to be reported in a later section. 
 
While these modeling efforts by academic researchers were underway, assuming an 
unconstrained market design, a great deal of detailed work by the Illinois EPA was also 
underway on the actual design of the market in the light of their concerns.  These design 
decisions were also subject to ideas, pressures, and constraints from a number of 
constituencies that would be affected by or were interested in this new approach.  
 
The Evolution of VOC Cap-and-Trade Market Design and the Underlying 
Traditional Regulations 
 
The market design, (Emissions Reduction Market System or ERMS), while  inspired in 
general by the sulfur dioxide cap-and-trade approach, was not mandated by the federally 
legislated CAAA of 1990.  It was worked out in detail locally over a number of years by 
the Illinois EPA, a product of an elaborate procedure of technical air-shed modeling, 
discussions with advisory groups of concerned interests, and advice from a special expert 
design team.  Needless to say there were divergent ideas presented to and pressures on 
the agency in making a number of important decisions on the pollutant to be covered and 
the basic design of the market. We focus in this account on these market design options, 
the final decisions made on these options, and the bearing these decisions had on the 
performance of the decentralized market in the context of continuing centralized federal 
and state regulations. 
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The design process was carried out by a small team in the Illinois EPA headed by the 
director.  The first effort proposed was to develop a cap-and-trade approach to controlling 
NOx emissions locally (Gade 1993).  This was due in part, perhaps, because of the earlier 
unsuccessful effort to use a cap-and-trade mechanism in the Los Angeles area to limit 
VOC emissions, there called reactive organic gases (ROG).  The complexity of the 
sources of VOC emissions may have appeared daunting: they were generated by a wide 
diversity of emitters, many of them small; they arose from an even wider variety of 
production processes and inputs; and they were subject to an extensive range of 
traditional regulations, some of them applicable to the hazardous air pollutants (HAP) 
that comprised a sub-set of VOC emissions. 
 
In the Los Angles area, a number of participants from the business community had 
complained of the proposed tradable permit allotments and baselines, and several 
influential environmental groups had been concerned with hot spots that might result 
from autonomous and anonymous market decisions. The proposed market was 
abandoned and traditional regulation continued (Lents 2000).  Representatives of the 
Illinois EPA had visited Los Angeles to discuss the cap-and-trade market and the demise 
of this early program was likely a matter of concern.  
 
Furthermore, a number of attempts by the US EPA to launch VOC open market rather 
than cap-and-trade emissions trading in several states had achieved few transactions and 
little success in scattered applications around the country.  NOx emissions, also a major 
precursor of urban ozone, on the other hand, arising as they do from combustion in steam 
generating boilers of electric utilities and large manufacturing installations, may have 
appeared a more feasible line of attack for this decentralized regulatory measure (Gade 
1993). 
 
One of the problems soon uncovered by the Lake Michigan Air Directors’ Consortium, in 
their air-shed modeling of precursors of low-level ozone, was that the incoming levels of 
NOx concentrations to the Chicago non-attainment region were high, leaving little scope 
for a local market mechanism (LADCO 2000). The idea of a national rather than local 
effort to control NOx emissions secured support among state environmental regulators 
and the important Ozone Transport Assessment Group (OTAG) was formed with US 
EPA sponsorship to study sources of emissions and the movement of NOx concentrations 
around a large region.  The Illinois EPA Director was named the chair of OTAG and the 
results of this study became one of the foundations of the present national NOx control 
strategy that includes an option for states to participate in a NOx cap-and-trade market 
managed by the US EPA (OTAG 1997).  
 
Given the LADCO results, the emissions trading group within the Illinois EPA turned 
their attention in 1994 to the possibility and design of a local VOC cap-and-trade market.  
The authors of this study were fortunate in being able to participate in the design team 
discussions and in the dialogues with interest groups. Among these groups we found it 
difficult to detect a ground swell of support for the idea. The local environmental 
community was suspicious of an autonomous and anonymous market in place of more 
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traditional regulation, but if such a program were to be devised the cap should be a 
significant reduction from benchmark emissions, the market should be subdivided into 
separate areas to prevent hot spots, and banking should be viewed with great suspicion 
and, if permitted, hedged around with limitations to prevent temporal spikes in emissions.  
Perhaps most important, traditional regulation in all its forms should be continued in full 
force.  
 
The business community seemed divided; large businesses were generally favorable and 
argued for a smaller reduction in emissions under the cap, a unified market, and the 
option of a long banking horizon for tradable permits.  Small businesses, in particular, 
seemed more concerned about baselines, allotments, and the availability of tradable 
permits.  One business environmental manager, anticipating the continuance of traditional 
regulation, wrote, “This new system will not achieve its maximum potential for air 
quality improvement because of the fact that it is an overlay on the existing technology-
based command-and-control system” (Zosel 2000).  
 
Among government regulators there was a diversity of concerns, as mentioned, about this 
change in regulatory control. The environmental impact of this innovation was being 
questioned.  Certification of identifiable tradable permits requires a degree of accuracy of 
estimation of baseline emissions and of allotments among emitters.  Such identification 
and certification would be essential if non-emitters were to participate in the market. 
Monitoring procedures, based on source self-reporting, would have to assure compliance 
with market rules and the tracking and location of transactions.  Incentives both negative 
and positive would have to be created in developing enforcement rules. Few of these 
administrative procedures had been worked out in the case of a VOC cap-and-trade 
program.  
 
The Final Market Design 
 
The threshold level of 10 tons of VOC emissions during the five-month ozone season as a 
requirement for participating in the market was established to exclude small emitters. 
This reduced the 1,958 stationary sources identified in the 1990 VOC inventory to 283. 
Further reductions in numbers occurred due to negotiations over existing controls and 
prior emission reductions so that finally 179 participants were included in the year 2000 
start date, which was a delay of one year from the original plan given the number of 
decisions to be made and the complexity of the negotiations among all concerned parties 
(Illinois EPA  2000).   
 
What emerged from these negotiations was a cap-and-trade market with compromised 
features reflecting different and what seem now to be contradictory points of view. There 
was a clear statement that market participants were to continue to be subject to existing 
and evolving traditional regulation. The continuance of traditional regulation effectively 
limited the purchase of permits by a participant for use during any one year, as emissions 
could not exceed the level specified by centralized regulation.  The market was not 
fragmented, but covered the entire non-attainment area. The apparent cap was set at a 
12% reduction from baseline emissions calculated for each participant as the average of 
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historical 1994-1996 levels. Baseline emissions were subject to negotiation, complicated 
in many instances because of the difficulty of measuring emissions. In addition, there 
were important exceptions to be granted to participants from the 12% cap. 
 
In recognition of company concerns, certain participants were given 100% of their 
baseline HAP emissions in tradable permit allotments due to the stringent technology 
requirements on these emissions. Participants installing advanced control technologies 
prior to the start of the market beyond those required of traditional regulations were also 
given tradable permit allotments in full measure of the emission reductions attributable to 
these technologies. Companies that could demonstrate unusual conditions during the 
baseline period were allowed to substitute years in the interval 1990 through 1997. The 
aggregate cap was thus about a 10% reduction from negotiated baseline values, an 
indication of business concerns about the effects of the magnitude of the cap on control 
costs and their competitive status vis-à-vis other emitters in regions not implementing 
VOC cap-and-trade markets.  
 
Did these exceptions plus any bias in overstating baseline emissions of participants lead 
to an over-allotment of free tradable permits?  Such an over-allotment would help explain 
the deep emission reductions that occurred during the period 2000 to 20042. Obtaining 
reliable numbers on VOC emissions is not a trivial exercise. The volume of emissions 
that were certified for each participant was obtained both from the 1970 inventory, based 
on a variety of estimates, and the better quality annual emission reports required from 
emitters starting in 1992. Our statistical tests of the over-allotment hypothesis, reported in 
a later section, do not provide strong support of the view that over-allotment was a major 
cause of the market’s puzzling performance.   
 
Banking was to be allowed in the ERMS program but only for one year beyond the date 
of issuance of a dated tradable permit, in sharp contrast to the SO2 market where dated 
tradable permits could be held indefinitely. While banking was considered important by 
the business community in furthering inter-temporal cost effectiveness, it was strongly 
criticized by the environmental community as threatening spikes in emissions. Dated 
permit allotments were assured for future years and could be traded but not used in the 
current year to cover emissions. The one-year banking horizon compromise was destined 
to affect emitter decision-making in significant ways after the start of the market.  
 
In an effort to assure additional market liquidity, trading was open to non-emitters.  The 
number of ATUs traded was to be reported for individual emitters in the annual reports. 
Individual prices of transactions were not to be reported to the public, but averages for 
the year would be reported by the agency at the end of the year in its annual performance 
reports.  There would be no auction of permits to aid price discovery, but a voluntary 
electronic bulletin board, maintained by the agency, was established to list bids and 
offers. In recognition of the concerns of the business community about the availability of 
tradable permits, a separate account managed by the agency was established to sell 
                                                 
2 This seems to be the explanation favored by the personnel of the Division of Air Pollution Control of the 
Illinois EPA, which now manages ERMS, as stated in a meeting of August 25, 2004.  
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permits at a stated high price or 50% above market, whichever was lower. This account 
was funded by a small deduction from company permit allocations (Illinois EPA 2001).  
 
Certification of emissions by assigning numbers to each ATU allowed tracking of 
emissions and their sale to non-emitters. Transactions were to be reported to the agency, 
but pre- or post-trade approval was not required.  Monitoring of these transactions by the 
Illinois EPA together with the annual emission reports of emitters was to provide 
information on trading progress, as revealed in table 1, and also provide information of 
the location of transactions and any possible hot spots.  Enforcement rules included 
sample checks on reported emissions and penalties for emissions not covered by ATUs. 
 
The market thus began with dual rules: one set of rules imposed by prescriptive 
regulation, the other imposed by incentive-based regulation.  Participants were expected 
to conform to Maximum Achievable Control Technology or MACT standards set by the 
US EPA for HAP emissions, and Reasonably Achievable Control Technology or RACT 
standards for other VOC emissions set by the Illinois EPA, and other prescriptive 
regulation.  Participants were expected to conform to market rules, record keeping, and 
emissions reporting required by the cap-and-trade system.  Within these complex 
constraints, participants were free to buy, sell, or bank credits up to a year, and to decide 
on emissions control levels, hopefully, with control cost minimization objectives in mind. 
The inevitable tension in the regulating community between using traditional regulation 
to control emissions and prevent pollution problems from arising and allowing a 
permissive market program to determine these variables was not resolved, but co-existed 
in the conflicted market design.  
 
The diversity of these participants and their responses to market forces in the light of 
traditional regulation and market design features pulling in different ways would become 
a matter of key importance in determining the performance of the market.  It will be 
recalled that the SO2 cap-and-trade market was also subject to an underlying and 
continuing level of traditional regulation.  However, the cap in the second phase of the 
program was about a 50% reduction in emissions from baseline SO2 emissions in the 
1980s, and clearly was more binding than traditional regulation on most emitters 
(Ellerman et al 2000). In addition, these emissions were measured by means of more 
reliable, continuous electronic monitoring.  
 
The Diversity of Participants and Their Varied Market Participation 
 
VOC traditional regulation applies specifically to particular production processes and 
inputs of stationary sources limiting the rate of emissions per unit time or the quantity of 
VOCs in an input, and not, typically, the volume of emissions.  Given the wide diversity 
of VOC emitters by size, production processes, and use of inputs, the application of 
traditional regulation is mainly a long and complex list of regulatory requirements for 
particular control mechanisms or inputs such as after-burners, liquid absorbers, cans of 
paint, and the like. As controls generally apply to specific processes and inputs and not to 
participants, the result is that different participants experience different levels of controls. 
Furthermore, as these regulations change over time at an uneven rate, and emitters 
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change in size at an uneven rate, it becomes difficult to predict exactly which emitters 
will be affected most.  The phrase that “one size fits all” under command-and-control 
regulation applies only to emitters with identical production functions. It follows that 
neither are marginal control costs equated under traditional regulation nor are control 
costs minimized in the aggregate. 
 
As previously mentioned, sources in the Chicago region varied widely in a number of 
dimensions: in size, in SIC classification, and in production processes and inputs.  They 
range from leather goods and plating shops through refineries, food products, and drug 
companies subject to varied RACT controls, and other regulations.  Furthermore, about 
half of all sources have some hazardous air pollutants, such as benzene, among their 
VOC emissions subject to the tighter standards of MACT controls, and other regulations. 
This disparate assortment of sources of VOC emissions contrasts with sulfur dioxide 
emissions arising largely from the burning of coal in steam boilers and with NOx 
emissions arising largely from combustion in steam boilers.   
 
One convenient and summary way to depict some of this variation is by Lorenz Curves in 
which emissions size is aligned with market variables.  Size of emitter was measured as a 
ratio of each emitter’s ATU allotment in 2001 divided by the maximum ATU allotment 
in 2001. The distribution of participants by size in figures 1a, 1b, and 1c reveals many 
small firms and about 20 large firms. Participants are arrayed by size along the horizontal 
axis and fractions of them are calculated from smallest to largest.  Then, fractions of 
tradable permit allotments, emissions, banks, purchases and sales, and expirations of 
permits calculated for each size fraction are revealed on the vertical axis. 
 
For the year 2000, as portrayed in figure 1a, we may estimate that the smallest 50% of 
participants had less than 25% of allotments, emissions, and banks, whereas the top 10%, 
about 20 firms, had some 50 % of these variables.  In sharp contrast to the curves for 
emissions, allotments, banks, and expirations, are the curves for tradable permit buys and 
sells. They reveal a more even distribution among the participants by size; in fact, the top 
10% of the firms had relatively few buy but more sell transactions.  We interpret these 
buy and sell curves as indicating the different pressures of traditional regulation on 
emitters of different characteristics; those buying ATUs during the period were less 
affected by prescriptive rules and had higher levels of emissions relative to allotments 
and those selling were more affected by prescriptive rules and had lower levels of 
emissions.  These hypotheses are subject to further testing in a later section. 
 
The profiles are similar for the year 2001 where we have added expirations of vintage 
2000 credits to figure 1b.  Again, the top 10% accounted for close to 50% of allotments, 
emissions, banks, and expirations, but few of the buys.  Again, larger emitters had 
relatively more sell transactions. We note from the curve for expirations of credits that 
the larger participants, specifically the top 20% of participants by size, allowed about 
70% of the total expirations to lapse (as may be estimated from figure 1b).  Our 
hypothesis is that traditional regulation bore more heavily on these larger emitters leaving 





























































Fig. 1c. Holdings of dependent variables by participant size in 2001 
 
 
What the Lorenz Curves do not tell us are the reasons for the transactions among the few 
emitters who entered the market, and more important, the reasons the vast majority of 
emitters did not enter the market. As a first step in this direction, we have identified four 
important factors or variables affecting these groups and their market transactions 
differently, and we now turn to ways to measure these variables. 
 
Our account of the pressures of prior and continuing centralized regulation imply that 
those emitters with the greatest reduction of emissions from this factor would be most 
likely to sell, and those with the smallest reductions or no reductions at all would be most 
likely to buy ATUs.  In addition, to the extent that traditional regulation was the 
important binding factor driving emissions below allotments, a large surplus of ATUs 
would be created making it difficult for the majority of emitters wishing to sell ATUs to 
enter the market at all.  The competing hypothesis is that excessive baselines and 
exceptions to the cap affected market performance. The recession that began in 2001 
could also play a role and could be expected to stimulate ATU sales of participants more 
sensitive to the cycle and stimulate ATU purchases of those less sensitive.  Finally, the 
cap-and-trade rules could be binding on some of the participants least affected by 
centralized regulation. Our task is to measure the relative importance of these four forces 
on market transactions. 
 
We provide in a later section a more complete probit and traditional regression analysis 
of the significance of these variables in affecting transactions together with other possible 
variables affecting participant decisions. At this point we present a description of how we 
propose to estimate the variables representing these forces, and provide a preliminary test 
of their importance.  
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For the first variable, traditional regulation, we divide individual participant emissions 
during 1998 by their baselines as determined by the Illinois EPA generally in the period 
1994-1996.  We believe the lower this ratio the more the continuing pressure of extended 
traditional regulation on emission reductions during this period. The measure is taken to 
be exogenous to market transactions as the market design in 1998 was in the development 
stage with few of its features finally determined.  We have labeled this variable REG for 
traditional regulation. 
 
Note our hypothesis assumes that the numerator has been reduced by traditional 
regulation whereas the competing hypothesis assumes that the denominator has been 
increased by excessive baselines.  We experimented with several measures that seemed 
related to the over-allotment view recognizing that, without direct evidence, it would be a 
difficult task.  We tried a ratio of emissions exempt from the cap, as explained earlier, to 
the stated baseline emissions, and variations on this theme, but none of these variables 
proved superior to the REG variable.  We finally settled on a dummy variable coded one 
for those participants with HAP emissions on the basis that their individual emissions 
reduction would be less than 12%, leaving them with excess ATUs to sell and less 
incentive to buy.  This variable is coded HAPDUM. 
 
To estimate the recession variable, we calculate the ratio of 2001 emissions to 2000 
emissions and argue that it reflects the impact of the recession on production and hence 
on emissions.  Emissions were already so reduced by traditional regulation by 2000 that it 
seems conservative and safe to attribute most of further reductions to the recession. 
Continuing traditional regulation was also likely to play a role in this time period, but we 
adopt a conservative stance toward attributing any further explanatory power to it.  The 
recession can be considered exogenous in our estimation method.  We have labeled this 
variable DIP. 
 
For the influence of the cap, we calculate the ratio for each participant of 2000 emissions 
divided by 1998 emissions.  While traditional regulation would continue to exert its 
sway, we adopt the conservative position that any emission reductions participants 
undertook in this period reflected the market cap and any price expectations.  We have 
labeled this variable ERM (emissions reduction market).  Construction of all these 
variables required spreadsheets with individual data for which we are indebted to the 
Illinois EPA. 
    
A closer look at the frequency distributions of these variables could provide valuable 
information about the differing impacts on emitters and their market decisions.  These 
distributions, presented in table 2, reveal that these pressures on emitters varied widely  
among individual emitters.  Perhaps most surprising is the wide-ranging impact of the 
REG variable in reducing emissions before the start of the ERMS program.  This finding 
stands in stark contrast to the frequent statements that command-and-control regulation is 
a “one size fits all” regulation.  On the contrary, the distribution indicates that 22% of 
emitters had emission reductions by 1998 of 40% or below baseline volumes, 43% of 
emitters had reductions of 60% or below, and 74% of emitters had reductions of 80% or 
below.  Only 14% of emitters reported emissions greater than baseline values by 1998.  
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Frequency and Cumulative Distributions of Emitters  
for REG, ERM, and DIP Ratio Intervals 
 Frequency Distributions Cumulative Distributions 
Ratio Intervals   REG ERM DIP REG ERM DIP 
       
0.0 to 0.2 15 5 11 15 5 11 
0.2 to 0.4 22 12 4 37 17 15 
0.4 to 0.6 36 23 13 73 40 28 
0.6 to 0.8 51 28 29 124 68 57 
0.8 to 1.0 21 30 50 145 98 107 
1.0 to 1.2 13 30 36 158 128 143 
1.2 to 1.4 3 17 17 161 145 160 
1.4 to 1.6 3 5 6 164 150 166 
1.6 to 1.8 2 3 0 166 153 166 
1.8 to 2.0 0 6 0 166 159 166 
2.0 to 2.2 0 2 0 166 161 166 
2.2 to 2.4 0 2 0 166 163 166 
2.4 to 2.6 1 0 0 167 163 166 
2.6 to 2.8 0 1 0 167 164 166 
2.8 to 3.0 1 0 0 168 164 166 
3.0 and above 0 4 2 168 168 168 
       
Notes:  N = 168 emitters for whom all data were available.  The REG mean = .672             
and the variance = .155.  The ERM mean = 1.401 and the variance = 17.59.  The     
DIP mean = .902 and the variance = .246. Ranges for the three series are (.00613 – 
2.811), (.0103 – 49.25) and (0.0 – 4.592) respectively.  
 
The spread of the emitters among the ERM intervals can be interpreted as an indication 
of the differences in marginal control costs, and the spread of the DIP variable as an 
indication of the varying impact of the recession.  
 
One plausible hypothesis is that the emission size of participants in the market would be 
highly correlated with emission reductions prior to the start of the market, the larger the 
emitter the larger the proportion of reductions.  We have provided a test of that 
hypothesis in figure 2 where an array from smallest to largest measured by emissions size 
of all 168 emitters is plotted along the abscissa and the REG ratio along the ordinate.  
There is little drift to lower REG ratios of 1998 to baseline emissions along the axis.  
 
What is more revealing about figure 2 is the vivid portrayal of the wide diversity of REG 
ratios among emitters.  If each bar initially were a nail at unity, it is as if the hammer of 
traditional regulation had struck widely different blows on the nails driving most of them 
below unity, and some very much below.  We interpret this as evidence for the idea that 
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traditional regulation is geared to processes and inputs and not to enterprises. Some 
caution is advised in this interpretation as some emitters may have experienced output, 
product, or production technique changes that explain some of this variation.  However,   
these changes during this period of prosperity more likely explain the few ratios greater 
than unity.  
 
















Fig. 2: Variation in REG ratios by emissions size of participants 
 
Our hypotheses have now been sharpened to state that the variables, REG, ERM, 
HAPDUM, and DIP, have affected the market transactions of emitters, and more 
specifically, that they affected buyers and sellers of tradable permits differently. For our 
next test of this hypothesis, in table 3 we have grouped participants by their involvement 
or lack of it in the market and calculated the median values of the ratios for each group.  
We use the medians because of a few outlier observations affecting the mean.  
 
The relevant feature of table 3 is its confirmation that the ratio for traditional regulation, 
REG, reveals the most dramatic difference between buyers and sellers, as hypothesized. 
Those emitters with the lowest ratio, indicating that traditional regulation bore most 
heavily on their compliance decisions in reducing emissions, were more frequently in the 
market as sellers, and those emitters with the higher ratios, indicating that traditional 
regulation was less pressing, were in the market more frequently as buyers.  These 
differences were significant at the 95% confidence level. 
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Another interesting feature not revealed in table 3 is that very few emitters were both 
buyers and sellers during the four years.  The occurrence of both persistence of buying or 
selling and the widely divergent REG ratios of buyers and sellers is not accidental.  The 
pressures of traditional regulation on most emitters led them to have such a surplus of 
ATUs that they either sold, or tried to sell, ATUs during the entire period.  For those 
fewer emitters with less pressure from traditional regulation, it was a buyer’s market.  
Participants were buyers because of above average growth of output or below average 
impact of traditional regulation, and, perhaps, less sensitivity to the recession. The 
opposite is true for the sellers who had a surplus of tradable permits that were very 
difficult to sell in the chronic buyer’s market.  
         
Table 3 
Median Ratios of ATU Buyers and Sellers  













      
Buyers in any one or more years   29 17.3 0.935 1.078 0.933
      
Sellers in any one or more years      31 18.4 0.518 0.834 0.911
      
Never a buyer or seller 108 64.3 0.637 0.850 0.836
      
Totals   168       100    
      
 
Note:  the number of emitters in table 3 is different from the number of participants in 
table 1 because this table includes only emitters for whom we had complete data of the 
kinds required. Several emitters shut down their operations but continued to sell their 
ATUs.  These shut downs deserve separate investigation, but we have deleted them from 
our sample on the grounds that their economic calculations differed from continuing 
emitters. The number of buyers and sellers will also differ between tables 1 and 3 because 
we count as a buyer or seller any emitter who transacted in one or more of the three years 
in table 3 compared with counting only those buyers or sellers who transacted in just one 
year in table 1.  
 
In fact, the great majority of participants who were neither buyers nor sellers had on the 
average a surplus of tradable permits that were not sold and therefore expired after a year.  
It is apparent that the transactions costs were very different for these two groups of 
transactors; that is, transactions costs were asymmetric during this period.  The few 
buyers could check the bulletin board and find a number of sellers willing to sell, and 
then negotiate from strength over price. For buyers, search, negotiation, and settlement 
costs were at a minimum.  For sellers, these costs were much higher as most frequently 
no buyers were listed on the electronic board and they would have to contact the full list 
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of participants.  Few brokers were active in the market, and if they had any interest it was 
in finding buyers. Given the declining price of ATUs during the period, it is likely that 
most sellers felt it was not worthwhile to pursue the matter. 
  
Emitters with the lowest ERM ratio, reflecting the effect of the cap-and-trade market in 
the decisions to reduce emissions, entered the market more often as sellers, and emitters 
with higher ratios entered the market as buyers. The difference is more marked than in 
the case of the recession variable but less marked than in the case of the traditional 
regulation variable. Emitters with the lowest DIP ratio entered the market as sellers more 
often, and emitters with higher ratios entered the market as buyers more often, but the 
difference is much less marked than either the case of the REG or ERM variables, 
indicative to us of the lesser impact of the recession on emission reductions.  
 
For a deeper probing into the reasons participants did or did not participate in the market, 
we turn to a more detailed statistical analysis of variables that affected individual 
participant decisions  
 
Statistical Analysis of Individual Emitter ATU Purchases and Sales, and Further 
Tests of Our Hypotheses 
 
We can more fully exploit our data on individual participant transactions over the four 
years, or lack of such activity, by incorporating our ratio variables with other plausible 
determinants of transaction decisions. As we mentioned, we shall utilize two statistical 
tools well suited to our variables, probit and traditional regression, to test for significance 
and for the quantitative contribution of each variable to a reduction in unexplained 
variation of transaction activity.  
 
We have estimated a measure of the variation of marginal control costs among emitters 
by making use of a World Bank study of these costs by Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) groups, and assigning the measure to each participant in a particular group (the 
WBMCC variable). As mentioned, we have also identified participants with HAP 
emissions among their VOC emissions and assigned a dummy value of unity to those 
identified (the HAPDUM variable).   
 
For the dependent variables, we have chosen the number of ATUs bought or sold by 
individual emitters during each of the four years, which yields eight variables suitable for 
traditional regression analysis since we view the explanatory variables as orthogonal to 
the disturbance term in each equation, thus avoiding the issue of single equation least 
squares bias. To reduce the influence on the regression of a few emitters with large 
transactions, we have also chosen probit analysis by coding a unit value for individual 
participants that bought ATUs in each of the four years, and then coding a unit value for 
each participant that sold.  This yields eight additional variables suitable for probit 
regression. 
 
Our hypotheses were that the effect of traditional regulation, the REG variable, would be 
positive and significant in its role in the buy equations, and negative and significant in the 
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sell equations. That is, the lower the ratio the less pressure to buy, and the more pressure 
to sell. Given the fact that it was very much a buyer’s market during the four years, we 
were less sure of the significance of the sell equation results. The HAPDUM variable was 
created to capture an aspect of excessive allotment of tradable permits. Our hypothesis 
was that this dummy coded 1 for participants with HAPs would yield a negative 
coefficient for ATU purchases because of excess ATUs, and a positive coefficient in the 
sell equations because emitters would try to sell these excess ATUs.  
 
The ERM ratio variable ought to have negative signs for sellers and positive for buyers, a 
reflection.  This could be due to innovative efforts to reduce emissions and profit from 
sales on the part of emitters who could lower costs, or to avoid reducing emissions on the 
part of emitters who had difficulty in this endeavor.  That is, the lower this ratio the more 
effective had been the innovative efforts and the more ATUs there would be to sell. The 
WBMCC variable was introduced to measure the strength of the theoretical argument that 
high marginal cost emitters would more likely buy (a positive coefficient) and low 
marginal cost emitters would more likely sell (a negative coefficient). We believed the 
DIP variable would have similar impacts on buys and sells, although probably less 
significant given the relatively shallow nature of the recession. 
 
The results are presented in tables 4A and 4B.  Note that we have been able to obtain 
additional transactions data from the Illinois EPA web pages for the year 2003, whereas 
the aggregate data for 2000 through 2002 were obtained from the previously listed 
Performance Reports. The result most worthy of note, in our view, is the significance and 
importance of the variables reflecting traditional regulation. The REG variable is 
positive, significant at the 95% level, and most important in the buy equations, and 
negative and significant in the sell equations, both in the probit and traditional regression 
analysis, as hypothesized. By importance we mean that it makes the largest contribution 
to a reduction in unexplained variance for almost all of the dependent variables. As an 
indication of its importance we find that the REG variable entered first in a stepwise 
regression in all but one equation, contributing over 50% of the explained variation.  The 
one exception occurred in the sell 2001 equation, where it came in second to HAPDUM. 
 
The HAPDUM variable was not significant in the OLS Buy equations and of the wrong 
sign in the first year. It was the wrong sign in the probit equations and significant in the 
first year.  In the OLS Sell equations, the HAPDUM variable was of the wrong sign in all 
of the years and significant in two of the years.  These results also held in the probit 
equations. Our interpretation of these unexpected results is that the HAPDUM variable 
may be indicative of the constraining effect of traditional regulation rather than over-
allotment.  That is, the stringent MACT controls required full use of allotted ATUs and 
left little maneuvering for the market. 
 
The market variable, ERM, contributed explanatory power to the buy equations 
especially significant in the probit regressions. That the ERM variable was more 
significant in the probit equations is consistent with our Lorenz Curve findings that large 











     
 Dependent Variables (N = 168) 
Explanatory Variables Buy 2000 Buy 2001 Buy 2002 Buy 2003 
      
REG 26.035 32.482 40.412 40.588 
  (5.337) (4.229) (3.765) (2.543) 
HAPDUM 4.043 -1.397 -3.996 -2.423 
  (1.058) (-0.232) (-0.475) (-0.194) 
ERM 1.347 1.315 1.537 1.129 
  (2.963) (1.836) (1.536) (0.759) 
WBMCC 0.012 0.052 0.038 -0.003 
  (0.542) (1.446) (0.75) (-0.042) 
DIP 1.754 5.519 14.933 17.815 
  (0.471) (0.941) (1.823) (1.462) 
CONSTANT -15.561 -20.675 -29.113 -24.579 
 (-2.786) (-2.351) (-2.369) (-1.345) 
     
Adjusted R-squared 0.148 0.108 0.009 0.002 
 
 
Probit Estimation Results 
     
 Dependent Variables (N = 168) 
Explanatory Variables Buy 2000 Buy 2001 Buy 2002 Buy 2003 
      
REG 2.468 1.273 1.183 1.294 
  (4.942) (3.439) (3.491) (3.669) 
HAPDUM 0.770 0.104 0.391 1.294 
  (2.314) (0.319) (1.316) (0.380) 
ERM 0.120 0.86 0.093 0.083 
  (2.285) (2.211) (2.066) (2.182) 
WBMCC 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (1.246) (1.589) (1.322) (1.384) 
DIP 0.280 0.286 0.504 0.627 
  (1.049) (0.921) (2.195) (2.282) 
CONSTANT -3.958 -2.891 -2.961 -3.172 




Determinants of ATU Sales 
2000-2003 
 
OLS Estimation Results 
     
 Dependent Variables (N = 168) 
Explanatory Variables Sell 2000 Sell 2001 Sell 2002 Sell 2003 
      
REG -14.907 -42.621 -48.972 -51.552 
  (-2.099) (-2.066) (-2.934) (-1.753) 
HAPDUM -6.921 -34.336 -28.710 -0.547 
  (-1.245) (-2.125) (-2.197) (-0.024) 
ERM -0.704 -2.141 -2.253 -2.012 
  (-1.063) (-1.114) (-1.449) (-0.734) 
WBMCC -0.008 -0.020 -0.018 -0.001 
  (-0.249) (-0.206) (-0.137) (-0.008) 
DIP 1.715 -18.983 -14.673 -19.752 
  (0.316) (-1.206) (-1.152) (-0.880) 
CONSTANT 22.721 86.538 85.892 88.494 
 (2.794) (3.664) (4.495) (2.629) 
     




Probit Estimation Results 
     
 Dependent Variables (N = 168) 
Explanatory Variables Sell 2000 Sell 2001 Sell 2002 Sell 2003 
      
REG -1.337 -1.806 -2.079 -2.077 
  (-2.499) (-2.946) (-3.319) (-3.460) 
HAPDUM -0.184 -0.898 -0.675 -0.272 
  (-0.681) (-2.867) (-2.322) (-0.989) 
ERM -0.217 -0.365 -0.429 -0.271 
  (-0.938) (-1.429) (-1.659) (-1.097) 
WBMCC 0.001 -0.0001 -0.002 -0.00004 
  (0.943) (-0.036) (-0.806) (-0.025) 
DIP 0.096 0.211 -0.005 -0.486 
  (0.371) (0.741) (-0.017) (-1.324) 
CONSTANT -0.211 0.377 0.818 0.908 




ratios but few buy transactions could affect the OLS results. For the 15% or so of emitters 
not deeply constrained by traditional regulation, the market offered opportunities 
for purchases that could have reduced their control costs as reflected in these equations. 
These variables lost their significance in the sell equations, indicative of the difficulty of 
selling ATUs in a buyer’s market for those emitters affected by traditional regulation. 
The marginal control cost variable (WBMCC), the best estimate we could obtain,  
revealed no significance indicating to us that marginal control costs were driven higher 
than ATU prices by traditional regulation.  The option of increasing emissions to reduce 
costs was limited because of traditional regulation.  We also note that the adjusted 2R  is 
much less in the sell equations, again evidence of a buyer’s market. 
 
The DIP variable proved to have little explanatory power and proved to be significant in 
only two of the buy (probit) equations.  Its role as an explanation of the performance of 
the market was limited in our findings.  
 
A further note on our probit results is in order.  The OLS models reported above are 
subject to the attack, as we have mentioned, that there may be a few large firms in the 
market that might skew the results. To test if our OLS results are sensitive to possible  
firm-size related outliers, we have run probit models for the same model. Here the left  
hand side is not the amount the firm bought or sold but whether in fact it bought or sold. 
In place of predicting the amount bought or sold, we are predicting if in fact a firm 
will be a buyer or seller (Greene 2004).  
 
Our probit results generally confirm the OLS results. For example, the REG variable is 
highly significant and of the hypothesized sign in all buy equations.  In all sell equations 
it has the expected sign and is significant in all but one sell equation. The ERM variable 
is again positive and significant in the probit buy equations, and although not significant, 
it is of the expected negative sign in the sell equations. Generally consistent results were 
obtained for the variables WBMCC and HAPDUM.  The DIP variable reveals more 
significance in the probit results for the years 2002 and 2003, indicating to us that those 
participants experiencing limited impacts of the recession (with high ratios) were first 
back in the market.  Overall, our probit models suggest that we can have additional 
confidence in the primary OLS results. 
 
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
Our main theme has been that both maintenance and extension of traditional regulations 
before and during the four-year start-up period of the Chicago VOC cap-and-trade 
approach when combined with key market design features have constrained its 
performance and greatly limited its cost-effectiveness, innovation stimulation, and 
flexibility. Our HAPDUM variable when interpreted as a proxy for over-allotment was of 
the wrong sign. However, the signs are consistent with the hypothesis that the HAPDUM 
variable may be interpreted as another measure of the binding effect of traditional 
regulation.  In this context we note that the HAPDUM coefficients are significant in two 
of the four years.  
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A basic difficulty of the over-allotment hypothesis is that participants appear to have 
made little effort to use any excess ATUs they might have had to cover emissions but 
allowed them to expire. More detailed data on individual emitter marginal costs and more 
information on transactions costs would be desirable, but we do not believe they would 
alter our results and conclusions.  Nor do we believe that if the present cap-and-trade 
market were to continue without redesign would the picture be changed in the future.  
The enormous banks and low emission levels would continue to dominate the scene, 
resulting in more expirations and continuing low prices of ATUs. 
 
Few, roughly 15% of all emitters, entered into transactions.  This low percentage makes 
any estimate of  control cost savings compared with traditional regulation an exercise in 
small numbers.  Estimating savings without transactions due to the decentralization of 
decision-making seems another low-payoff exercise due to the massive emission 
reductions well before the start of the market.  
 
It might well be asked whether the ERMS program is a decoration on the face of 
traditional regulation that serves little purpose other than to be in accord with the latest 
regulatory fashion.  It was an innovative undertaking implemented at considerable effort 
with appreciable ingenuity by the Illinois EPA.  The problem was the compromised 
design indicating how sensitive a cap-and-trade market can be to design features. 
Any reasonable benefit cost appraisal would point toward discontinuance of ERMS 
without loss in air quality. It was supposed to be an emissions reducing, cost-effective, 
innovation stimulating, and flexible tool, which it has not been by any evidence we have 
seen or been able to muster.  Few, if any, large urban areas are likely to adopt such a 
facade. 
 
Should ERMS be scrapped?  We believe there are several good reasons to answer no to 
this question.  It was an achievement of the Illinois EPA to pioneer in implementing the 
program, and now that it is in place and has received general acceptance, if not 
wholehearted approval, it can be the foundation for further improvement.  There are 
several directions in which this improvement could take place. 
 
One course of action would be to relax the traditional regulations in force or set them 
aside to make way for the market. However, neither the environmental community nor 
the regulating community would support such a relaxation.  
 
Another course of action recognizes that the new national NOx control program nearing 
full implementation presents new opportunities. The Illinois EPA had chosen to 
participate in the US managed cap-and-trade program based on state NOx budgets.  The 
relationship between these two major precursors of urban ozone, NOx and VOC 
emissions, is an important and complicated one.  Reductions in NOx emissions call for a 
reexamination of the proper level of VOC emissions.  This proper level is also affected 
greatly by a new public policy that calls for a new eight-hour standard for urban ozone 
concentrations, a reduction of about one third from the prior standard. These 
developments have important implications for a redesigned ERMS program.  
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A change of the cap is clearly a priority issue for redesign. However, the proper cap is not 
a simple calculation.  It seems clear that a substantial tightening of the cap is in order.  
Building on the experience of the SO2 cap design, this could be accomplished in a series 
of steps.  As more is learned about the relationship of NOx and VOC precursors to low 
level ozone concentrations, the caps could be set as an important part of the eight-hour 
attainment plan.  Some revision of baselines that seem far in excess of realistic historical 
values might accompany the changed caps. Even though there has been a dramatic 
aggregate reduction in VOC emissions among the stationary sources now covered by the 
market, some emitters, especially those not deeply affected by traditional regulation, may 
resist such a cap tightening. It will be recalled that the distribution of emission reductions 
brought about by traditional regulation varies markedly among emitters.  Revision of the 
banking horizon may provide a trade-off for these and other emitters. 
 
Extension of the one-year banking horizon should improve inter-temporal decision 
making significantly. The environmental community may be concerned with inter-
temporal spikes, which have not emerged in the aggregate data so far.  However, there 
are other measures to deal with possible spikes, such as constraints on the use of banks if 
they mount to high levels. If an infinite horizon of tradable permits is unacceptable to 
environmental groups or the regulating community, an extension of three to four years 
after issuance could be a useful compromise. The present enormous banks could be 
converted to a new system by some discounting of existing banks.  The business 
community is unlikely to complain about the loss of ATUs that will probably expire 
anyway.  
 
The new cap, baselines, and banking horizon would be essential features of a more 
effective market. Tighter caps should appeal to the environmental community, as it would 
help to continue to curb temporal spikes and neighborhood hot spots. These hot spots 
have not materialized during the current episode, as documented by the agency and 
studied by a research group (Illinois EPA 2000-2003; Kosobud, Stokes, and Tallarico 
2004).  This market would take its rightful place among other cap-and-trade programs 
(Ellerman 2003). It could even participate in other areas of traditional regulation, as once 
envisioned, by stationary source emitters receiving tradable permit credits for reductions 
among mobile and small area sources. No such credits have yet been achieved. 
 
There are other aspects of the market design that should be considered.  More prompt and 
timely price information ought to be made available by the Illinois EPA.  The electronic 
bulletin board was a good idea that was little used by buyers.  More frequent summary 
price data could be supplied.  Private brokers and others, including speculators, could be 
invited to publish their own data once a reinvigorated market was underway. 
  
References 
Cantor Fitzgerald Environmental Brokerage Services. 1999.  Market Price Index 6/22/99. 
New York, NY. 
 
 27
Ellerman, A. D., Paul L. Joskow, Richard Schmalensee, Juan-Pablo Montero, and 
Elizabeth Bailey.  2000. Markets for Clean Air : The U. S. Acid Rain Program. 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ellerman, A. D. 2003. ”Are cap-and-trade programs more environmentally effective than 
conventional regulation’’?  Working paper 03-015.  Center for Energy and 
Environmental Policy Research.  MIT October.  
 
Evans D. A., H. Onal, and J. B. Braden.  1997. “An Empirical Analysis of the Emissions 
Reduction Market System for Volatile Organic Materials in Chicago”.  Paper presented 
to the 1997 meetings of the Illinois Economics Association, Chicago, Ill. 
 
Gade, M. A. 1993. “The Challenges Facing Illinois in Achieving Balance Between a 
Cleaner Environment and Economic Growth”.  In R. F. Kosobud, W.A. Testa, and D. A. 
Hanson, Eds. Cost Effective Control of Urban Smog. Chicago: Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago. 4-8.  
 
Greene, W. H. 2004. Econometric Analysis, fourth edition. Prentice Hall, N. J. 
 
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. 1996. “Technical Support Document for VOM 
Emissions Reduction Market System”. Springfield, IL. 
 
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. 2000, 2001 & 2002. “Annual Performance 
Review Reports: Emissions Reduction Market System”.  Springfield, IL.  
 
Kosobud, R.F., H. H. Stokes, and C. D. Tallarico. 2001. “Modeling the Cost- 
Effectiveness of Reducing Chicago Area Air Pollution by Emission Trading”. Working 
Paper 92.  The Institute of Government and Public Affairs. University of Illinois.  July.  
 
Kosobud, R. F., H. H. Stokes, and C. D. Tallarico. 2004. “Does Emissions Trading Lead 
to Air Pollution Hot Spots?  Evidence from an Urban Ozone Control Program”. The 
International Journal of Environmental Technology and Management, vol. 4, nos 1-2, pp 
137-156. 
 
LADCO (Lake Michigan Air Directors Consortium). 2000. “Application of the 
REMSAD Modeling System to the Midwest”. Des Plaines, IL. January18. 
 
Lents, J. M. 2000. ‘The RECLAIM program after three years”.  R. F. Kosobud, H. M. 
Biggs, D. L. Schreder, Eds. Emissions Trading: Environmental Policy’s New Approach. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, 219-240. 
 
OTAG (Ozone Transport Assessment Group). 1997. Executive Report.  Environmental 
Council of the States, Washington, DC. 
 
 28
Stavins, R. N. 2000.  “What Do We Really Know About Market-Based Approaches to 
Environmental Policy?” In R. F. Kosobud, H. M. Biggs, and D. L. Schreder, editors. 
Emissions Trading: Environmental Policy’s New Approach. John Wiley & Sons, 49-60. 
 
US EPA. 2004a.  “Table of Final MACT Rules”. <http://www.epa.gov/ttn/mactfnl.html>. 
July. 
 
US EPA. 2004b. “National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Revision of 
List of Categories and Schedules for Standards under Section 1122 of the Clean Air Act”. 
< http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-AIR/1998/February/Day-12/a3446.htm>. Federal 
Register, February 12, 1998, v 63, n 29, p 7155-7166. July.  
 
World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). 1994.  “The Cost 
of Air Pollution Abatement”. Policy Research Paper 1398. Washington, DC. 
 
Zosel, T. W. 2000. “VOC Emissions Trading From an Industrial Perspective:  Past,  
Present, and Future”.  R. F. Kosobud, H. M. Biggs, D. L. Schreder, Eds.  Emissions 
Trading: Environmental Policy’s New Approach.  New York: John Wiley & Sons, 295-
301. 
 29
